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INTRODUCTION

The American labor movement has repeatedly urged Congress
to enact legislation establishing collective bargaining rights for state
and local government employees. Pro-labor congressmen have introduced bills to that effect each year since 1970,1 and the election
in 1976 of both a Democratic President and an overwhelmingly
Democratic Congress has greatly increased political pressure. 2 Despite these developments, a comprehensive, dispassionate analysis
of the crucial issues and numerous proposals on the subject has yet
to appear.3
This Article seeks to fill that void. Its purpose is twofold: (1)
to present and analyze the various arguments for and against federal legislation on public sector 4 collective bargaining and (2) to
examine the specific proposals now before Congress. The close
balance between competing arguments and the shortcomings of
current legislative proposals help explain why, despite the astound' For

a discussion of the most widely supported of the proposed bills, see notes 127-

204 and accompanying text infra. The Committee Reports of the ABA Section of Labor
Relations Law provide an annual account of the fate of these bills. See ABA SECTION OF
LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1977 COMMITTEE REPORTS (pt. 2) 259-60 (1977) (Report of the
Committee on State and Local Government Bargaining); ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1976 COMMITTEE REPORTS (pt. 2) 430-32 (1976) (Report of the Committee on
State and Local Government Bargaining); ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1975
COMMITTEE REPORTS (pt. 1) 293-94 (1975) (Report of the Committee on State Labor Law
and Public Employee Bargaining); ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, 1974 COMMITTEE REPORTS 320-21 (1974) (Report of the Committee on State Labor Law and Public
Employee Bargaining). See also Williams, Public Employee Collective Bargaining: The Need for a
FederalPresence, 1 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 85, 114-21 (1976).
2
See, e.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 5; NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
PROPOSED PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AMENDMENTS FOR THE 95TH CONGRESS (1977)

[hereinafter cited as NEA PROPOSALS].
3 Although many observers have addressed the subject, most of the commentary has
been narrow, cursory, or one-sided. See Baird, National Legislationfor Public Employees: "End
Run" on the Wagner Act?, 61 ILL B.J. 410 (1973); Bilik, Close the Gap: NLRB and Public
Employees, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 456 (1970); Boynton, Industrial Collective Bargainingin the Public
Sector: Because It's There?, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 568 (1972); Brown, Federal Legislation for
Public Sector Collective Bargaining: A Minimum Standards Approach, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 681
(1974); Heddinger, ProposedBargainingLegislation May Violate States' Rights, 4 J. COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 329 (1975); Mass & Gottlieb, Federally Legislated Collective Bargainingfor State and Local Government: A Logical Imperative, 2 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 273 (1977);
McCann & Smiley, The National Labor Relations Act and the Regulation of Public Employee
Collective Bargaining, 13 HARV. J. LEGIS. 479 (1976); Petro, Sovereignty and Compulsory Public
Sector Bargaining, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25 (1974); Sebris, The Right to Collective Bargaining for All Public Employees: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 4 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
PUB. SECTOR 297 (1975); Williams, supra note 1.
4 As used herein, the term "public sector" refers only to governmental agencies of
state-wide or lesser jurisdiction; it therefore excludes multi-state and federal government
agencies.
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ing growth of membership in public employee unions5 and the
willingness of most states to engage in collective bargaining, 6
neither house of Congress has ever passed a public sector bargaining bill.

THE MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PUBLIC
SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Proponents of federal legislation have expended surprisingly
little effort in extolling the virtues of collective bargaining in the
public sector. Apparently, advocates of public sector bargaining
view the benefits of private sector bargaining as self-evident and
assume that these benefits would also accrue in the context of government employment. Thus, many commentators appear to support public sector bargaining "because it's there."7 To the extent
debate exists, it centers on three distinct arguments: first, that public employees need collective bargaining rights to achieve equity
with workers in the private sector; second, that collective bargaining fosters labor peace by preventing more strikes and strife than it
creates; and third, that public employees need the additional power
they gain through collective bargaining to protect themselves from
overreaching employers.
A.

The Equity Argument

The equity argument appears to be of consummate simplicity:
since private sector employees may legally engage in collective bargaining, denying public employees that privilege relegates them to
second-class status.8 The argument is, however, much more com5Nationwide, union membership among employees of state and local governments
rose from 556,000 in 1964 to 1,710,000 in 1976, an increase of 207.6%. During the same
period, union membership among nongovernmental employees grew only 9.3%. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS,

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND

EM-

1977, cited in [1977] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 726, at 24,
27; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS
1975-REFERENCE EDITION, Table 155, at 384 (1975) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK OF
PLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS,

LABOR STATISTICS].
6 By one recent

count, 37 states have enacted at least one statute dealing with collective
bargaining for public employees. McCann & Smiley, supra note 3, at 495. In a number of
other states, collective bargaining exists without formal authorization. Nolan, Public
Employee Unionism in the Southeast: The Legal Parameters, 29 S.C. L. REv. 235, 267 (1977). For
a current summary of state law on public sector labor relations, see [1970-1977] 1 GOV'T
EMPL. REL REP. (BNA) (Reference File) 51:501-51:531.
7
See Boynton, supra note 3.
'See generally Bilik, supra note 3; Harum, Are Public Unions Second Class Citizens? Yes:
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plex than this statement indicates. Proponents of public sector bargaining do not suggest that there are no differences between public
and private employment. They assert, however, that the similarities
between the two far outweigh these differences, and that existing
differences are too insignificant to justify disparate treatment regarding bargaining rights.
Walter McCann and Stafford Smiley put the case clearly. 9
They note that "many of the functions performed by governmental agencies are not uniquely governmental";1 0 in fact, well over
half of all public employees engage in activities with significant
private sector counterparts, such as education, hospitals, utilities,
and recreational and environmental facilities. 1 Many of these
jobs are "indistinguishable from jobs available in the private sector" and "[t]here is no reason to believe that individuals do not
move between the public and private sectors. . . in response to job
availability and relative wage and benefit levels.'
Moreover,
many of these employees belong to the same unions that represent
3
private sector employees.'
The argument is plausible, and, if valid, would lead naturally
to the conclusion that public employees should have the same bargaining rights as private employees. It has not, however, convinced
skeptics. Professor Myron Lieberman, for example, notes that the
concept of equity itself requires definition.' 4 It cannot mean that in
each and every condition of employment, public and private
employees must be treated alike; that would, by extension, require
either depriving public employees of civil service protection or
granting it to private employees, and either eliminating all restrictions on political activities by public employees or extending them
to private workers. "Equity" must therefore denote comparable
packages of rights and benefits.
Legal Warfare Continues as They Struggle for Bona Fide Collective Negotiations, 48 FLA. B.J. 92
(1974).
1 See McCann & Smiley, supra note 3.
'0 Id. at 515.
Id. at 515-16.
11Id. at 516 (footnote omitted).
" Id. Even those jobs without direct private sector counterparts, such as police and fire
protection, are not unique in all respects. They may be "essential" and therefore different
from "non-essential" lines of work, but so are several categories of private sector jobs possessing bargaining rights. Railroads, airlines, and electric power plants exemplify "essential"
private activities.
"4Address by Myron Lieberman on Equity and Collective Bargaining in Education to
AASA Convention (Feb. 28, 1977), reprinted in [1977] GoV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No.
699, at 33, 33.
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If equity is to be meaningful, however, it must take into account

all the advantages and disadvantages of employment in the two
sectors. The fact that public employees do not have particular

rights accorded private sector employees may not be an inequity
if there are advantages associated with public but not private
employment. 15
Although not all public employees would acknowledge the
general superiority of public employment, it does offer several advantages over private employment. Professor Lieberman notes the
following: (1) Public employees have a significant influence on the
determination of "who is management"; that is, they can engage in
some forms of political activity to obtain a more sympathetic employer. (2) Public enterprise cannot move; thus public employees are free of fear that the employer may close up shop and move
to a new location. (3) Public employees, at least those who have
acquired an expectancy of reemployment, cannot be dismissed
without due process of law; and all public employees are protected
by the Constitution from discipline or discharge for discriminatory
reasons or for exercising first amendment rights. (4) Public
employees "frequently have the benefit of an extensive system of
statutory benefits which must be bargained in the private sector";
among these benefits are tenure and other job security systems,
16
sick leave, vacation pay, and retirement plans.
Although Professor Lieberman's point is perhaps obvious, it is
seldom discussed. His argument does not directly attack public sector collective bargaining. It instead suggests that collective bargaining advocates bear the burden of demonstrating that the entire
package of benefits and drawbacks associated with public employment is significantly less valuable than its private sector counterpart. If that showing is made, the equity argument would weigh
heavily in favor of public sector bargaining. Until then, however,
17
the argument lends no support to reformers' demands.
15 Id. (emphasis in original).
d. at 34.
17 None of the recent congressional hearings on public sector bargaining bills contains
any support for the proposition that public employment is less advantageous than private
employment. See Public Employee Labor-Management Relations: Hearings on H.R. 77 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings]; National Public Employment Relations Act, 1974: Hearings on S. 3295 and S. 3294 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as
1974 Senate Hearings];Labor-Management Relations in the Public Sector: Hearings on H.R, 8677
and H.R. 9730 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and
16
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The Labor Peace Argument

In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) to minimize "industrial strife and unrest" by removing one
of its major causes-the refusal of some employers to engage in
collective bargaining. 1 8 The Act stated:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of
employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes
the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of
industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out
of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions
19

The policy statements in current public sector bargaining proposals
also view labor peace as a prime objective. A bill introduced in 1977
by Representative Roybal of California quotes the above NLRA
language almost verbatim, 20 as do several earlier proposals.2 '
We can reduce the labor peace argument to a testable hypothesis: collective bargaining reduces the incidence of strikes in
the public sector. 2 2 Available data, however, refute this hypothesis.
Private sector strikes have increased threefold since enactment of
the NLRA, 3 and public sector strikes are far more common in
states that engage in bargaining than in those that do not. Although only one of the ten southeastern states has a comprehensive
bargaining statute for public employees,2 4 the southeast suffered
Labor, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973-1974) [hereinafter cited as 1973-1974 House Hearings];
Labor-ManagementRelations in the Public Sector: Hearings on H.R. 12532, H.R. 7684 and H.R.
9324 Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 House Hearings].
", National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
19 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
20 The bill states that the refusal of some employers to engage in collective bargaining
"leads to strikes and other forms of strife and unrest, with the consequent effect of
obstructing the flow of commerce." H.R. 1987, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 1 (1977).
21 See, e.g., H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 7684, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1971).
22 "Strikes" here provide a quantifiable index of "strife and unrest."
23 The number rose from 2,014 in 1935 to 6,031 in 1974. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1976, Table 623, at
386 (1976); HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 5, Table 159, at 390. This is not to

say that factors other than the NLRA were not at play; it indicates only that further proof
is required to demonstrate that the NLRA reduced labor strife. See notes 28 & 33 infra.
24 Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia comprise, for our purposes, the southeastern states.
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only five percent of the 478 strikes against state and local governments in 1975. Of the 318,500 workers involved in the 1975
strikes, less than 12,000--or 3. 7 %-were in the southeast, and a
third of those were in the one state authorizing collective bargaining.2 5 In the face of such statistics, supporters of the labor peace
argument bear a heavy burden of proof.
Implicit in the hypothesis that collective bargaining reduces
strike activity is the assumption that many public employees strike
to force employers to engage in bargaining rather than to win
specific concessions in the course of bargaining. A typical expression of this assumption is this statement by Representative Frank
Thompson, Jr. of New Jersey, Chairman of the House Subcommittee dealing with public sector bargaining legislation and sponsor of
one of the major bills under consideration:
A great many people, when one discusses this legislation,
express tremendous fear of strikes. The fact is that in almost every
instance those strikes arefor recognition as distinguishedfrom disputes
over wages, hours, working conditions. History shows that once recognition is granted by inclusion2 6under the [NLRA], the recognition strike virtually disappears.
The Labor Department does not provide the exact percentage of
public sector strikes attributable to recognition disputes, because it
combines these strikes with several others under the general heading of "union organization and security." It is clear, however,
that-contrary to Representative Thompson's assertions-the percentage of pure recognition strikes must be extremely low, for in
1975 the "union organization and security" category accounted for
only 5.2 % of public sector strikes and for only 2.6 % of the workers
involved in such strikes.27 Thus, even assuming that bargaining
Among these states, only Florida has a comprehensive bargaining statute. Nolan, supra note
6, at 255.
25 Id. at 237. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORK STOPPAGES
1975, Tables 5, 8, 9, reprinted in [1974-1977] 2 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP.
(BNA) (Reference File) 71:1015, 71:1017, 71:1019 [hereinafter cited as WORK STOPPAGES
IN GOVERNMENT]. Again, it should be noted that other factors have not been held constant.
26 1973-1974 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 78 (remarks of Rep. Thompson) (emphasis added). Rep. William D. Ford of Michigan agrees:
I am suggesting to you out of your cited 2 million man-days of idleness [caused by
strikes in the public sector] you will find a majority of those came about as a result
of either the refusal of a public body to recognize the employees for bargaining
purposes, or, a refusal of a public body to bargain in good faith.
Id. at 108 (remarks of Rep. Ford).
27 WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, supra note 25, Table 6, at 71:1016. Allowing for
strikes over agency shop, union shop, and dues checkoff demands, and over other matters
IN GOVERNMENT,
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legislation would eliminate all recognition strikes-hardly a realistic
assumption in light of private sector experience 28 -it would not
significantly contribute to labor peace unless it had additional beneficial effects.2 9
Because it is impossible to hold constant factors other than the
availability of collective bargaining, it is difficult to determine precisely the effect of bargaining statutes. However, available data reveal a strong correlation between passage of bargaining legislation
and an increase in public sector strikes. For example, public
employee bargaining statutes and public employee strikes were
both rare before 1960. By 1974, such statutes were common, 30 and
public employee strikes were literally an everyday occurrence.3 1
Moreover, states with mandatory bargaining such as Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Michigan, suffered the most severe disrup32
tions.
We can approach the labor peace argument from a different
included under the heading of "union organization and security," a more reasonable estimate of the percentage of pure recognition strikes would be in the neighborhood of 1%-2%.
Another Department of Labor statistic supports this figure. In 1975, only 3.3% of all public
sector strikes (16 out of 478) were called by unions without official recognition-that is, by
those unions that could conceivably be seeking recognition. These 16 included strikes for all
reasons, however, and the percentage of pure recognition strikes must therefore have been
less than 3.3%. Id., Table A-5, at 71:1031.
28 In 1973, 38 years after passage of the NLRA, recognition questions were at issue in
4.2% of the nation's private sector strikes. HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 5,
Table 162, at 405.
29 It has been suggested, for example, that "[c]ollective bargaining minimizes conflict
and helps reduce the potential for strikes by providing a mechanism for settlement of
disputes without strikes." 1972 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 43-44 (statement of Jerry
Wurf, President, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME)).
30 See note 6 supra.
31 In 1975, there were 478 public sector strikes, or 1.3 per day. WORK STOPPAGES IN
GOVERNMENT, supra note 25, Table 1, at 71:1012.

111973-1974 House Hearings,supra note 17, at 98 (statement of Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs.). In
Michigan alone, strikes by nonstate public employees jumped dramatically from only two in
the eight years preceding passage of the state's collective bargaining act to 103 in the three
years following passage. 1972 House Hearings,supra note 17, at 254-55 (statement of Robert
Taylor, Nat'l Legislative Chairman, Am. Ass'n of Classified School Employees).
Among teachers, the most populous category of public employees, there appears to be a
tendency toward increased strike activity following the enactment of bargaining legislation.
Thornton & Weintraub, Public Employee BargainingLaws and the Propensity To Strike: The Case
of Public School Teachers, 3 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 33 (1974). A recent

study by the Public Service Research Council reached a similar conclusion with regard to
public employees generally. "In every state except one, passage of a compulsory public sector
bargaining law has resulted in increased strike activity." PUBLIC SERVICE RESEARCH COUNCIL,
PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AND STRIKES 5 (2d ed. 1976).
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standpoint. Perhaps bargaining legislation leads to an increase in
strike activity in the short run, but to a decrease in the long run
after the collective bargaining process has been accepted. Statistics
for the private sector are unclear, but they do not support this
hypothesis.
Unfortunately, strike activity data fluctuate widely from year
to year, apparently in response to other factors. Comparing the
first five years after adoption of the NLRA with the most recent
five-year period for which statistics are available, however, we find
virtually no change in the level of private sector strike activity even
though collective bargaining has become far more common. 33
Thus, private sector data do not support the rephrased labor peace
argument, but, because of other variables, the data do not refute it.
Public sector data are much less plentiful, in part because
most public bargaining legislation was enacted too recently to allow analysis of long-term effects. In 1965, six states-California,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oregon, and Washington
-adopted
collective bargaining legislation covering teachers.3 4
The following table summarizes teachers' strike activity in these
states during the first and second five-year periods beginning with
the school year 1965-1966.
In California and Massachusetts, teachers' strikes decreased
markedly in the second five-year period; in Connecticut and
Washington, they increased markedly; and in Michigan and Oregon, there was no significant change. These figures should be read
cautiously, however, because other variables have powerful effects.
In 1975 alone, for example, California had 12 strikes in education,
Connecticut 11, and Massachusetts 4;35 in each case, this was far
above the yearly average for either of the five-year periods. Other
calculations are similarly inconclusive. 3 6 Thus, these figures pro3' To correct for the enormous growth in employment since the adoption of the NLRA
in 1935, we must take as a measure of strike activity the percentage of workers involved in
strikes in a given year and the percentage of total working time in the nonfarm economy lost
to strikes, rather than the absolute number of strikes. In 1936-1940, an average of 3.7% of
the work force was involved in strikes each year; in 1969-1973, the figure was 3.6%. HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 5, Table 159, at 390-91. The 1936-1940 figures were,
by comparison, much higher than the 1.9% average for 1924-1928, the last five-year period
before the Depression. Id. In 1936-1940, an average of .23% of the nation's working time
was lost to strikes; in 1969-1973, the average was .24%. Id.
4
See PUBLIC SERVICE RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 32, at 6-9. Several of these laws
covered other categories of public employees as well.
35 WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, supra note 25, Table 9, at 71:1019.
'6 For example, Wisconsin, which passed bargaining legislation covering teachers in

428
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37

Teachers' Strikes During Five-Year Periods

California
Connecticut
Massachusetts
Michigan
Oregon
Washington
a

School Years
1965-1966 to
1969-1970

School Years
1970-1971 to
1974-1975

% Change

26
15
10
124
0
0

14
20
3
126
2
16

- 46%
+33.3%
-70%
+ 1.6%
+ a
+ a

Percentage calculation impossible due to zero base figure.

vide no reason to believe that the availability of collective bargaining reduces the frequency of public sector strikes.
A mere correlation between bargaining legislation and strikes
does not establish a causal relationship and assertions of such a
relationship are subject to statistical refutation.3 s As a result, the
labor peace argument cannot be regarded as conclusively disproved. It is more accurate to say that the argument is unproved,
and that available statistics offer no support for it.
C.

The BargainingPower Argument

Like the labor peace argument, the bargaining power argument harks back to the NLRA. In that Act, Congress found:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of
contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the

1959, had no teacher strikes at all until 1967-1968, when it had just one. During the next
seven school years, when collective bargaining was widespread, it had 40 more. D. COLTON,
Do PUBLIC EMPLOYEE BARGAINING LAWS INCREASE TEACHER STRIKES?, Table I, at 5 (1977).
'7 These data are condensed from id.
3' See id. at 9. Colton challenges the Public Service Research Council report (see note 32
supra) on the basis of flaws in the collection and compilation of data. D. COLTON, supra note
36, at 2-4. After a study of statistics on teachers' strikes, he failed to find any causal relationship with bargaining legislation. Id. at 3-4, 9.
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stabilization of competitive wage
rates and working conditions
39
within and between industries.
The NLRA established statutory collective bargaining rights in part
to restore "equality of bargaining power between employers and
employees. 4 °
Although the statute's principle of economic anticompetitiveness sounds somewhat archaic today, the unstated premise that
bargaining should be used to give employees a greater share of the
economic pie finds modern manifestations. Representative Roybal's
bill explicitly seeks to restore "equality of bargaining power,"' 4 1 and
academic commentators appear equally concerned that an existing
inequality results in unfair treatment of public employees.4 2
"Bargaining power" is used here as a political term, not an
economic one. To economists, the phrase refers to the "highest
alternative salary one can get from other jobs" 43 without regard for
the size or wealth of the parties. In the political sense the term can
have either of two meanings. It often refers to the deeply held
belief that employees are always cheated on the price of their labor
and therefore deserve more from their employers. Because of its
complete subjectivity, this argument is not debatable. However, it
will not persuade one who does not accept it to support legislation
designed to help employees. It is more profitable, then, to treat the
term as part of an empirical argument asserting that in the absence
of collective bargaining public employers treat their employees
"unfairly" as judged by some objective standard.
The only objective standard suggested by proponents of public
sector bargaining is a comparison with private sector employees.
Such a comparison, however, provides little support for their
cause. In a typical statement, two advocates of bargaining legislation rely on the undocumented assertion that "[i]n the forty years
since the passage of the Wagner Act, public sector employees often
have fallen behind their private sector counterparts in compensation and benefits. ' 44 The word "often" is imprecise, but if it implies
that public employees generally lag behind their private sector
39 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
40 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
41 H.R. 1987, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1977).
42
See, e.g., Mass & Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 276-77; McCann & Smiley, supra note 3, at
523-24.
43 A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION

AND CONTROL 396 (2d ed. 1977) (emphasis in original).
44 Mass & Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 276.
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counterparts, it contradicts the available data. Several studies indicate that where differences in wages occur between comparable
government and private employees, such differences frequently
favor public employees. 4 5 Furthermore, these studies do not consider the nonmonetary advantages of public employment. 4 6 Any
meaningful comparison of private and public employment should
consider the value of all these factors. Although a formidable task,
until it is undertaken we cannot conclude that public employees
need collective bargaining rights to achieve fair wages and benefits.
Even assuming that public employees are in some sense treated
unfairly, it is not clear that unionization would solve the problem.
Although economic analysis shows that private sector unions increase wages about ten to fifteen percent above the nonunion level,
that increase is at the expense of nonunionized employees and
results in overall reduced employment.4 7 "[I]n a fundamental
sense, employees do not compete against employers; they compete
against other labor. ' 48 Moreover, by altering the wage structure
and opposing many technological innovations, private sector
unions create "an obstacle to the optimum performance of our
economic system."4 9 Unions may well have off-setting noneconomic
benefits, 50 but Congress should determine who will benefit and
who will suffer before passing legislation to strengthen unions in
the public sector.
Many studies in recent years have focused on the wage effects
of public sector unions. 5 1 Although the results of these studies
4' See Orr, Public Employee CompensationLevels, in PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONS: A STUDY OF
THE CRISIS IN PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 131 (A. Chickering ed. 1976); Reder, The
Theory of Employment and Wages in the Public Sector, in LABOR IN THE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT
SECTORS 38-48 (D. Hamermesh ed. 1975); Smith, Pay Differentials Between FederalGovernment
and Private Sector Workers, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 179 (1976).
46

See text accompanying note 16 supra.

H.G. LEWIS, UNIONISM AND RELATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES 10-46, 183-94,
286-96 (1963); A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 69-99 (1962). One recent study
suggests that the union-nonunion wage differential may be somewhat less. See Boskin,
41

Unions and Relative Real Wages, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 466 (1972).
11 A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 43, at 402. See also Vieira, Of Syndicalism, Slavery,
and the Thirteenth Amendment: The Unconstitutionalityof "Exclusive Representation"in Public-Sector
Employment, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 515, 543-51 (1976).
19 A. REES, supra note 47, at 194.
50 1d. at 195.
51 See, e.g., Ashenfelter, The Effect of Unionization on Wages in the Public Sector:
The Case
of Fire Fighters, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 191 (1971); Baird & Landon, The Effects of
Collective Bargaining on Public School Teachers' Salaries, 25 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 410
(1972), and Kasper, Reply, id. at 417; Ehrenberg, Municipal Government Structure, Unionization, and the Wages of Fire Fighters, 27 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 36 (1973); Ehrenberg &
Goldstein, A Model of Public Sector Wage Determination, 2 J. URBAN ECON. 223 (1975);
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vary, they seem to indicate an "average" wage effect of about five
percent, 52 somewhat less than that produced by unionization in the
private sector. Union-negotiated increases of whatever size will
have to come at the expense of either nonunion public employees
or reduced employment opportunities, as in the private sector-or
at the expense of the taxpayer, who will either pay more taxes or
receive fewer services. The bargaining power argument thus involves a trade-off, for there is no free source of funds. If Congress
chooses to make the trade-to increase the power and wealth of
unionized public employees, and decrease the power and wealth of
some other segment of society-it will presumably act as a result of
evidence that the trade will redress injustice or promote the common good. To date, however, proponents have not submitted any
such evidence.
D. Additional Considerations
Opponents of public sector bargaining have raised a number
of objections which, if valid, would far outweigh the proponents'
arguments discussed above. Because these objections are based
largely on speculation rather than empirical data, no attempt will
be made to prove or disprove them. The objections (and responses
thereto by bargaining proponents) are presented only to suggest
the risks involved in bargaining and the need for further research.
1. Impact on the Quality, Scale, and Cost of Public Services
As put most forcefully by Professor Robert S. Summers in a
recent monograph, 53 public sector bargaining could have detriFreund, Market and Union Influences on Municipal Employee Wages, 27 INDUS. & LAB. REL
REV. 391 (1974); Frey, Wage Determinationin Public Schools and the Effects of Unionization, in
LABOR IN THE PUBLIC AND NONPROFIT SECTORS, supra note 45, at 183; Hall & Carroll, The
Effect of Teachers' Organizations on Salaries and Class Size, 26 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 834
(1973); Hall & Vanderporten, Unionization, Monopsony Power, and Police Salaries, 16 INDUS.
REL. 94 (1977); Kasper, On the Effect of Collective Bargainingon Resources Allocation in Public
Schools, 23 ECON. & Bus. BULL. 1 (spring-summer 1971); Kasper, The Effects of Collective
Bargaining on Public School Teachers' Salaries, 24 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 57 (1970); Lewin,
Public Sector Labor Relations, 18 LAB. HIST. 132, 136-40 (1977); Lipsky & Drotning, The
Influence of Collective Bargainingon Teachers' Salariesin New York State, 27 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 18 (1973); Schmenner, The Determinationof MunicipalEmployee Wages, 55 REV. ECON. &
STATISTICS 83 (1973); Thornton, The Effects of Collective Negotiations on Teachers' Salaries, 11
Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 37 (winter 1971). For a convenient summary of the major studies,
see Lewin, supra at 136-37.
52 Lewin, supra note 51, at 138.
53 R. SUMMERS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PUBLIC BENEFIT CONFERRAL: A JURISPRUDENTIAL CRITIQUE

29-43 (1976).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:419

mental effects on the quality, scale, and cost of public services.
Attempting to prove either a beneficial or detrimental effect raises
severe methodological problems. The advocate would be required
to show, inter alia, that a change in public services occurred, that
bargaining caused the change, that the change was beneficial (or
detrimental), and that the effects of the change were not out54
weighed by more serious detrimental (or beneficial) results.
Summers therefore suggests an alternative method of evaluation
which he terms a "rebuttal strategy": 55
[O]pponents [of bargaining legislation] would be required to
make out a kind of "prima facie" case that their specific claim of
diminishing effect is sufficiently strong to force the proponents
to undertake the task of rebuttal. The elements of each "prima
facie" case of adverse benefit impact that the opponents would
have to make out would be (1) that an instance of a type of effect
has occurred or is occurring, (2) that it is attributable at least
partly to collective bargaining, (3) that the occurrence is likely not
to be merely an isolated and unrepresentative instance of the
workings of bargaining, and (4) that the effect actually diminishes
benefit.
Once such a "prima facie" case is made out, the proponents
would then be called upon to rebut it. They might (1) deny that
the effect occurred or occurs and marshal available evidence to
show as much, or (2) deny that the effect is at all attributable to
collective bargaining and marshal evidence to show this, or (3)
admit the effect and that it is attributable to collective bargaining,
but deny that it will ever occur again or deny that it is likely to
occur with any significant frequency, and support these denials
with whatever evidence can be marshaled, or (4) deny that the
effect truly diminishes benefit and support this with available
evidence and argument.
If the proponents are unable to rebut the specific prima
facie case involved via one or more of the foregoing four moves
then that specific prima facie case would stand unrebutted as a
factor weighing against bargaining.But if the proponents satisfactorily rebut this case, then this factor at least would not itself
count agairist bargaining. 56
Summers then suggests a number of possible prima facie cases
of bargaining's detrimental effects on public school education.
Brief sketches of two of them are provided here.
54 Id. at 30-35.

55
Id. at 35-36.
56
Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
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a. Length of the School Day. Teachers' unions have on occasion
negotiated a reduction in length of the school day, as in New York
City in 1974 (parts 1 and 2 of the prima facie case). From the
public's point of view this change is detrimental because it reduces
the amount of teaching without reducing the cost of schools (part
4). Is this an isolated instance under part 3 of the prima facie case?
Summers suggests not. Since hours are like money and reduced
work is like a raise, unions are likely to continue to press for such
provisions.57
b. The ProbationaryProcess. Public schools use a probationary
period to evaluate new teachers before granting them tenure.
Teachers' unions frequently bargain for shorter probationary periods, lower standards for granting tenure, and a rigid, quasijudicial procedure for denial of tenure (parts 1 and 2 of Summers'
test). In the public's view, such changes are detrimental because
they increase the likelihood that marginally qualified teachers will
receive tenure (part 4). Moreover, the issue is important enough to
arise in almost all negotiations (part 3).58
Summers argues that many such prima facie cases could be
established and that satisfactory rebuttal will often be impossible.
That being so, "the proponents would still not have discharged
their burden of persuading the legislature that bargaining is a good
thing in light of its benefit impact";59 therefore, they should not
prevail.
Summers' arguments are perhaps too recent to have drawn a
response. Certainly the existing literature does not deal with his
basic thesis. Public sector unions have frequently suggested that
they produce favorable results, 60 but such statements do not sufficiently answer the fundamental challenge Professor Summers
poses.
2.

Impact on the Merit Principle of Public Employment

Several potential points of conflict exist between collective bargaining and the merit principle of the civil service system. The
essence of civil service is the belief that merit should, so far as
57
58

d. at 37.
Id. at 38-39.
59 Id. at 41-42.
60
See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 275 (statement of Albert Shanker,
President, Am. Fed'n of Teachers); 1973-1974 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 34-36
(statement of Dr. Helen D. Wise, President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n (NEA)); Selden, Needed: More
Teacher Strikes, in COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION FOR PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES 339
(R. Woodworth & R. Peterson eds. 1969).
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possible, be the sole determinant of hiring, promotion, and other
personnel decisions. Unions, by contrast, favor the use of criteria
not entirely congruent with objective merit, such as seniority, union
membership, or dues payment. Opponents of bargaining have
claimed that this potential conflict is so serious that to engage in
any bargaining will mean abandoning the merit principle.
[T]he decision is not where to draw the line. The decision is
about two kinds of personnel systems. Which are we going to
have? They are different. They employ different principles, and
they have different concerns. We can no longer believe that we
can be half collective bargaining and half merit system. 61
Proponents of bargaining dismiss these fears as unfounded.
They point out that the merit principle has never been strictly
followed in practice and that civil service systems are no longer
regarded as the protector of individual employees. To many, civil
service systems are but another arm of management. 62 Bargaining proponents also note that the impact of bargaining is not
uniform-that is, in many cases unions actually strengthen the
merit system by forcing administrators to follow their own rules
more strictly and by opposing elements of personal bias. 63 Finally,
bargaining advocates point out that recent research indicates a variety of ways in which bargaining and the merit principle can be
64
accommodated so that neither irreparably harms the other.
On this issue, then, opponents of bargaining are unconvincing.
They are correct in pointing to potential conflicts, but the potential
61 Morse, Shall We Bargain Away the Merit System?,

in DEVELOPMENTS

IN

PUBLIC

154, 160 (K. Warner ed.
1965). See also 1972 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 258, 263-64 (statement of James F.
Marshall, President, Assembly of Gov. Employees); Boynton, supra note 3, at 579.
62
See, e.g., 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 173, 175 (statement of Jerry Wurf,
President, AFSCME); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND THE MERIT SYSTEM 109 (1972); Lewin, Collective BargainingImpacts on Personnel
Administration in the American Public Sector, 27 LAB. L.J. 426, 427-29 (1976).
63 See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 176-78 (statement of Jerry Wurf, President, AFSCME); Horton, Lewin & Kuhn, Some Impacts of Collective Bargainingon Local Government: A Diversity Thesis, 7 AD. & Soc'Y 497 (1976); Lewin, supra note 62, at 429-35;
Lewin & Horton, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on the Merit System in Government, 30
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS:

LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE

ARB. J. 199 (1975).
64 See, e.g., D. STANLEY, MANAGING LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNDER UNION PRESSURE 32-59
(1972); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 62, at 110; Feigenbaum, Civil Service and Collective
Bargaining: Conflict or Compatibility?, 3 PUB. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 244 (1974); Helburn
& Bennett, Public Employee Bargainingand the Merit Principle, 23 LAB. L.J. 618 (1972); Stanley, What Are Unions Doing to Merit Systems?, 31 PUB. PERSONNEL REV. 108 (1970); Comment,
The Civil Service-Collective BargainingConflict in the Public Sector: Attempts at Reconciliation, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 826 (1971).
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is not sufficiently widespread or serious to impede the passage of
collective bargaining legislation.
3.

Impact on the Democratic System

Just as some commentators perceive an inherent conflict between the merit principle and collective bargaining, others believe
that public bargaining is inconsistent with our democratic system
of government. In part this attitude represents a traditional view
of the concept of sovereignty, that is, the principle that any ordered
government requires absolute power.65 Any requirement that the
government bargain with a group before taking action shatters the
state's absolute sovereignty. Most opponents-and all proponents
-of public sector bargaining reject this approach out of hand,
perhaps because political theory is out of fashion, and its style of
debate is not the mode in which most labor law commentators feel
comfortable. Sovereignty must, after all, "seem to the critics too
elusive and too remote a concept to be of practical significance in
66
the fashioning of labor policy.
In any event, most critics of public sector bargaining rely on a
more modern theory put forth initially by Professors Harry H.
Wellington and Ralph K. Winter, Jr.6 7 Borrowing a term from
political scientist Robert Dahl, they suggest that bargaining may be
inconsistent with the " 'normal' American political process" because
it gives unions the power "to withhold labor-to strike-as well
as to employ the usual methods of political pressure. ' 68 Granting
unions these two bites at the political apple may give them "a disproportionate share of effective power in the process of decision. 69
This argument builds upon the well-accepted principle that
the accumulation of "too much" political power by one interest
group threatens the integrity of the entire system. As Professor
Kurt Hanslowe put it a decade ago:
[I]t must also be recalled that a democratic political structure
has limits as to the amount of organized group pressure it can
tolerate. At some point the risk arises of a dangerous dilution of
governmental authority by its being squeezed to death by conflicting power blocks. If that point is reached, foreign policy is
6'See Petro, supra note 3,at 65.
66

Wellington & Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 78

L.J. 1107, 1109 (1969).
67See Wellington & Winter, supra note 66.
68
69

Id.at 1123.
Id.

YALE
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made by defense industry, agricultural policy by farmers, and
public personnel policy by employee organizations, and not by
government representing the wishes of an electorate consisting
of individual voters. If that point is reached, an orderly system of
individual liberty under lawful rule would seem to be the victim.
For surely it is difficult to conceive of a social order without a
for
governmental repository of authority, which is authoritative
70
the very reason that it is representative and democratic.

The question thus boils down to whether collective bargaining
gives public employee unions "too much" power. Wellington and
Winter's affirmative answer to this question triggered a lively debate that still continues. 71 Responses to Wellington and Winter
have taken several forms. Some writers argue that public sector
72
unions possess insufficient power to cause the harm envisioned.
as a
Others suggest that we should view collective bargaining not
73
Still
it.
of
part
integral
an
as
but
system
political
the
to
challenge
others believe that careful structuring of the bargaining process
can diffuse unhealthy concentrations of power.7 4

Neither side has converted the other, nor is either likely to.
10

K.

HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIc EMPLOYMENT 114

(1967) (emphasis in original). Hanslowe goes on to suggest that collective bargaining could
corrupt our democratic system by allowing unions to exchange political help for contracts
providing for compulsory union membership and coerced support of the union's political
activities. "Unless careful protections are worked out," warns Hanslowe,
the union shop in public employment has the potential of becoming a neat mutual
back-scratching mechanism, whereby public employee representatives and politicians each reinforce the other's interests and domain, with the individual public
employee and the individual citizen left to look on, while his employment conditions, and his tax rate, and public policies generally are being decided by entrenched and mutually supportive government officials and collective bargaining
representatives over whom the public has diminishing control.
Id. at 115.
"' See, e.g., R. SUMMERS, supra note 53, at 1-17; Burton & Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by Public Employees, 79 YALE L.J. 418 (1970); Clark, Politics and Public
Employee Unionism: Some Recommendations for an Emerging Problem, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 680
(1975); Love & Sulzner, PoliticalImplications of Public Employee Bargaining, 11 INDUS. REL. 18
(1972); Siegel & Kainen, Political Forces in Public Sector Collective Bargaining,21 CATH. U.L.
REV. 581 (1972); Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J.
1156 (1974); Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44
U. CIN. L. REV. 669 (1975); Wellington & Winter, More on Strikes by Public Employees, 79
YALE L.J. 441 (1970); Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 79 YALE L.J. 805 (1970); Project, Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public
Employment, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 887, 1034-51 (1972).
72 See Burton & Krider, supra note 71.
"See Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, supra note 71, at
1199-1200.
14 See Clark, supra note 71; Project, supra note 71, at 1034-51.
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Whether any group in our society is "too strong" will always depend upon individual perceptions of the group and its objectives.
As a result, the Wellington and Winter argument must stand more
as cautionary than as convincing. It articulates one unquantifiable
risk of public sector bargaining. Although it may influence the
form that bargaining laws will take, it will not, on its own, prevent
passage of such legislation.
E. Summary
Proponents of public sector bargaining legislation have not
demonstrated that public employees need bargaining rights to gain
equality with private sector employees. Similarly, they have provided no reason to believe that collective bargaining will reduce
labor strife, and have not provided any standard or evidence indicating that public employees have been treated so unfairly as to
need the added power that bargaining rights would give them.
Although they seem to have refuted the charge that bargaining
would destroy the merit system, they have dealt less successfully
with more serious problems concerning the adverse impact of bargaining on the quality, scale, and cost of public services. Finally,
bargaining advocates have not yet put to rest the most serious
allegation of all-that bargaining threatens the very fabric of our
political system.
In short, proponents have not carried the burden of persuasion on the merits of public sector collective bargaining. Political
forces being what they are, this may not prevent passage of bargaining legislation; it should, however, give congressmen much to
think about before supporting such a significant reform.
II
Is THERE A NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION?
Perhaps we are past the point where debates over the merits of
collective bargaining in the public sector have any significant impact. Collective bargaining, already widespread, may continue to
proliferate regardless of legislative action. Granting this, or even
granting the general desirability of such bargaining, it by no means
follows that federal action is essential.
We should note at the outset that the states have not ignored
public sector labor relations. At least thirty-seven states have laws
granting collective bargaining rights to some public employees, and
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laws in twenty-six of these cover most categories of employees.7 5
Many more states engage in bargaining pursuant to executive orders, attorney general's opinions, local ordinances, or de facto arrangements, 7 6 although many of these laws and customs apply only
to certain groups of employees, and several of them provide only
the most basic outline of a bargaining system. One could reasonably assume from these facts that state laws cover those employees
most likely to engage in bargaining (and, by extension, exclude
those not yet ready to bargain) and that gaps in the legislation are
filled in by mutual consent. Nevertheless, many commentators
argue that federal legislation is necessary in order to (1) guarantee
rights that the states would otherwise violate; (2) avoid the bias that
must attend any state's attempt to regulate its own labor relations;
and (3) provide uniformity among the states. The strength of these
arguments is far from overwhelming.
A. A Guaranteeof Rights
It has become commonplace to speak of federal legislation as
necessary to guarantee the "rights" of public employees. One
commentator has complained, for example, that an evaluation of
state laws "mostly reveals underaction" by the states in providing
the "essential elements of public sector bargaining rights."' 7 The
favorable connotations of the term "rights" may make such arguments politically effective, but the issue requires a more thorough
analysis.
To begin with, the "rights" in need of protection must have a
source. Jurisprudence recognizes four possible sources of rights:
moral or "natural" law, the Constitution, statutes, and common law.
Bargaining advocates have not relied on the first of these; nature,
it seems, does not command public sector collective bargaining.
The other potential sources warrant further discussion.
Several public employee unions have sought to establish the
existence of a constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining. They have been uniformly unsuccessful. The Constitution
does establish certain rights for public employees, such as the first
7
amendment protections of freedom of speech and association. 1
" See
76

McCann & Smiley, supra note 3, at 495-96.
See [1970-1977] 1 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) (Reference File) 51:501-51:531.
77Brown, supra note 3, at 711 (emphasis in original).
7'See generally Nolan, supra note 6, at 240-42.
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Public employees may not be punished for advocating or joining
unions, 9 but the Constitution goes little farther. Courts have consistently held that it does not establish a right to bargain collectively,80 a right to strike,' or a right to have union dues checked
off. 2 Those advocating public sector bargaining to guarantee the
rights of employees may be referring to the rights to advocate and
join unions, but no one has shown that public employers have
denied these rights in recent years. Moreover, the paucity of litigation on these questions suggests the contrary.
As to statutory rights, no federal statute generally extends bargaining rights to public employees. Thus, the proposed legislation
cannot be defended as necessary to safeguard existing statutory
rights. An argument based on statutory rights thus becomes
tautological: legislation is needed to protect the statutory rights that
the new legislation will create. Although this may accurately reflect
the desires of bargaining proponents, this form of the argument
adds nothing to the case for federal legislation.
Finally, proponents of public sector bargaining may be refer19 There are three leading cases on this point: AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137
(8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Atkins v. City of
Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969) (three-judge court).
0
SSee, e.g., Lontine v. VanCleave, 483 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1973); Indianapolis Educ.
Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th Cir. 1969); United Steelworkers v. Volker, 95
L.R.R.M. 2158 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Teamsters Local 822 v. City of Portsmouth, 423 F. Supp.
954 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 534 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1976); Board of Educ. v. AFSCME,
401 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Ga. 1975); United Steelworkers v. University of Ala., No. 75-H17885 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 1975), quoted in United Steelworkers v. Volker, 95 L.R.R.M.
2158, 2164-65 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit of N.C. Ass'n of
Educ. v. Phillips, 381 F. Supp. 644 (M.D.N.C. 1974) (three-judge court); Newport News
Fire Fighters Local 794 v. City of Newport News, 339 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Va. 1972); Melton
v. City of Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Bateman v. South Carolina State
Ports Auth., 298 F. Supp. 999 (D.S.C. 1969); Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068
(W.D.N.C. 1969) (three-judge court); Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm.
v. Windsor, 116 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ala. 1953) (three-judge court), affd men., 347 U.S. 901
(1954); International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Georgia Ports Auth., 217 Ga. 712, 124
S.E.2d 733, cert. denied, 370 U.S. 922 (1962); Cook County Police Ass'n v. City of Harvey, 8
Ill. App. 3d 147, 289 N.E.2d 226 (1972).
"' See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Volker, 95 L.R.R.M. 2158 (N.D. Ala. 1977); Johnson
v. City of Albany, Ga., 413 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ga. 1976); Teamsters Local 822 v. City of
Portsmouth, 423 F. Supp. 954, 957 (E.D. Va. 1975) (dictum), aff'd mem., 534 F.2d 328 (4th
Cir. 1976); Kirker v. Moore, 308 F. Supp. 615 (S.D.W. Va. 1970), affd per curiam, 436 F.2d
423 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971). Cf. Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. I v.
Hortonville Educ. Ass'n. 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (school board may constitutionally dismiss
teachers for striking).
2
1 See, e.g., City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S.. 283
(1976).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:419

ring to common-law rights. It is true that a number of courts have
83
upheld the legality of de facto public sector collective bargaining;
however, no court has found a common-law right to engage in
collective bargaining against the wishes of the public employer.
Therefore, the argument that federal legislation is necessary to
protect employee rights must be dismissed either because it is tautological or because no clear source of generally accepted rights
exists.
B.

The Elimination of Partiality

Public employee unions are reluctant to rely on state laws in
part because of their belief that the administration of these laws is
inherently biased in favor of the employer. One union official put
it rather bluntly: "A labor relations board appointed by the public
employer has no greater right to claim impartiality in disputes that
involve that public employer than a similar board appointed by the
president of General Electric in a labor matter involving GE.
An employer is an employer is an employer .... ,,84 In a more
academic vein, two scholars have noted that self-regulation in this
area raises at least the appearance of a conflict of interest that
could easily be removed by "[t]ransferring the rule-making func85
tion to another level of government"-the federal government.
Without some documentation of actual prejudice, however,
these statements are not persuasive. First, as a simple matter of
administrative experience, different agencies of the same government do not necessarily take the same positions. No one is surprised when the Department of State disagrees with the Department of Defense over a matter of international policy, or when the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor propose
competing economic plans. Such intragovernmental differences of
opinion would seem to be equally common at the state and local
levels. The reasons for divergent views--different backgrounds
and goals of officials, different statutes and regulations, and different pressures from "client" groups-undercut the assumption
83 See,

e.g., Louisiana Teachers' Ass'n v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 303 So. 2d 564 (La.

App. 1974), cert. denied, 305 So. 2d 541 (La. 1975). See generally Dole, State and Local Public
Employee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization, 54 IOWA L.
REv. 539, 539-51 (1969), and cases cited therein.
84 Bilik, supra note 3. at 480. Accord, 1972 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 47-48
(statement of erry Wurf, President, AFSCME).
8, McCann & Smiley, supra note 3, at 525.
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that state labor relations agencies are inevitably biased in favor of
state or local employers. Second, absent clear evidence of some personal or official interest in the outcome of a dispute, government officials are presumed as a matter of law to be acting without bias.
The recent Supreme Court decision in the Hortonville case 8 6 is illustrative. The school board in the Wisconsin town of Hortonville dismissed a group of teachers who had engaged in an illegal strike.
The teachers successfully sued in the Wisconsin courts to prevent
the terminations, arguing that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required evaluation of the teachers' conduct by
an impartial decisionmaker, and that the school board could not be
impartial. The Supreme Court rejected this argument on appeal:
"A showing that the Board was 'involved' in the events preceding
this decision, in light of the important interest in leaving with the
Board the power given by the state legislature, is not enough to
overcome the presumption of honesty
and integrity in policymak'87
power.
decisionmaking
with
ers
Although the due process clause is not at issue in the current
congressional struggle over public employee bargaining, the "presumption of honesty and integrity" acknowledged by the Supreme
Court discredits bargaining proponents' allegations of bias. Absent
some specific showing of prejudice against public employees, there
is no reason to assume that state or local administrators cannot act
impartially.
C.

Uniformity Among the States

One of the primary objectives of the NLRA was to eliminate
differences among the states in handling labor relations issues.8 8
This attempt to achieve nationwide uniformity was designed in
part to guarantee certain minimum standards of protection to all
employees 89 and in part to abolish competitive advantages accruing
to employers in states that did not protect collective bargaining
efforts. 90 Proponents of public sector collective bargaining invoke
these same arguments to demonstrate the need for federal legislation.
86 Hortonville

Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976).
at 496-97.
See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 198, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
89 Bilik, supra note 3, at 473.
90 McCann & Smiley, supra note 3, at 527 n.269.
87 Id.
88
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Some bargaining advocates direct their complaints at the
aesthetic impurity of the present system. 91 Others contend that the
anticompetitive objectives of the NLRA are equally valid in the
public sector. Mayor Coleman Young of Detroit, for example, believes that Michigan, which has a statute governing public sector
bargaining, has often lost revenue because businesses chose to lo92
cate instead in Ohio, which has no such statute.
The validity of this theory is dubious. To deal with Mayor
Young's example first, only actual bargaining and the severity of its
impact on tax rates would influence a business' choice of location-not whether bargaining has a statutory imprimatur. On that
score, there is little difference between Michigan and Ohio, for
bargaining is widespread in both states.93 More generally, no
measurable economic competition between states arises out of the
existence of public sector bargaining. Professors Wellington and
Winter put it this way: "New York City teachers are not paid less
because of competition with the school system of Decatur, Georgia.
Municipal employers simply do not compete in an interstate
product market which effectively prevents some states from adopting collective bargaining as a policy because others do not."94
Proponents of public sector bargaining also argue, with greater
plausibility, that only federal action can achieve "administrative
simplicity." Unquestionably, the current dispersion of authority
over public employees is far from "simple." This alone has prompted some commentators to call for federal legislation:
The current patchwork of agencies, without a unifying central authority, inevitably yields differences in administrative pol91See, e.g., 1972 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 32 (statement of Jerry Wurf, President, AFSCME) (union frustrated by "the astonishing jungle of state laws"); Erstling, Federal Regulation of Non-Federal Public Employment, 24 LAB. L.J. 739, 742 (1973) (differences
among the states "chaotic"); McCann & Smiley, supra note 3, at 519 (criticizing "patchwork
of agencies").

91See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 287-88 (statement of Mayor Young);
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL LEGISLATION FOR PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 63 (T. Colosi & S. Rynecki eds. 1975). Accord, McCann & Smiley, supra

note 3, at 527 n.269 ("States may still fear that public employee bargaining could force tax
rises that would place local business at a disadvantage compared to other States").

93 See Comment, The Authority of the Public Employer To Engage in Collective Bargainingin
the Absence of a State Statute: Ohio, A Case in Point, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 672, 673 (1975). If
strikes are any indication of the seriousness of collective bargaining, Ohio prevails easily
over Michigan. In 1975, the most recent year for which statistics are available, Ohio lost
more than twice as many man-days to public sector strikes (92,600) as Michigan (41,400).
WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, supra note 25, Table 8, at 71:1018.

91Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargainingin Public Employment, supra note
71, at 812.
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icy which are based more on local political pressures than on
irresistible administrative logic, or even on differences in statutory provisions. Lodging authority for administrative decisions in
a single board would not inevitably lead to consistency, as critics
of the NLRB would no doubt be quick to point out, but the
likelihood of consistency would increase. Furthermore, duplicative costs could be avoided. 95
This summary of the administrative simplicity argument contains several debatable points. Most obvious, perhaps, is the assumption that "political pressures" underlie local policies but that
"irresistible administrative logic" would underlie the proposed federal policies. Federal labor policy, from the initial passage of the
Wagner Act 96 to its amendment by the Taft-Hartley 9 7 and Landrum-Griffin 98 Acts, has always reflected "political pressures."
Moreover, if political pressures are to influence governmental
labor relations (and there is no reason why they should not), local,
as opposed to national, pressures approach more closely the democratic ideal; citizen impact at the local level is both more easily
achievable and more effective.
Second, the formation of a single federal agency would avoid
"duplicative costs" only if (1) the agency completely preempted all
state involvement and (2) it operated at a lower cost than the
preempted state agencies. Unfortunately, experience suggests that
neither projection would prove accurate. The experience of the
private sector does not indicate that state agencies would become
expendable; to the contrary, many states, despite the existence of
the National Labor Relations Board, have their own agencies to
deal with private companies not subject to the NLRA, or to provide
mediation and arbitration services. Nor can we assume that a single
95 McCann & Smiley, supra note 3, at 519 (footnote omitted). Closely related to this is
the suggestion by two other authors that diversified authority prevents adequate training of
labor relations experts for the public sector and limits the transferability of their experience. See Mass & Gottlieb, supra note 3, at 278. Although plausible at first glance, the
suggestion is not very convincing. It assumes that adequate training and experience can be
gained only within the bounds of a single statutory system, and rejects the possibility that
the professional could apply training in fundamental principles and issues to a different
labor relations system. In any event, the authors cite no evidence for their assertions, and
casual observation of the employment of labor relations experts does not support them.
9' National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
97 Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
98 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
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federal agency would cost less than numerous state agencies. Although only one board would be necessary, it would presumably
require a significant number of lesser officials, and the generally
higher federal pay schedules could negate any economies of scale.
These points are minor, however, compared to the fundamental difficulty posed by the uniformity argument. Federalism rests
upon the proposition that local government agencies best handle
local problems. In public sector labor relations, it is not unreasonable to assume that the needs of New York, heavily influenced by a
tradition of private sector unionization, differ from those of Mississippi, which lacks such a tradition.99 The lack of uniformity among
the states might, in other words, reflect rational and appropriate
responses to variances in local conditions. If so, the lack of uniformity in the current system is a benefit that we should preserve,
not a deficiency that we should eliminate.
Opponents of federal legislation go even farther, and argue
that premature imposition of a single federal system could actually
impede the resolution of public sector disputes. Public sector labor
relations is still in its infancy, most of its growth having come only
within the last decade. There is still little agreement over such
fundamental issues as unit determination, scope of bargaining, and
dispute resolution procedures. States have tried some twenty-five
different approaches to impasse resolution alone because of the
mix of advantages and disadvantages in each of the available models. 10 0 Until we reach a consensus on this and other crucial issues by
examination of the results of differing state approaches, it would
be foolhardy to stifle experimentation.'10
D.

Summary
To persuasively demonstrate the need for federal legislation,
bargaining advocates must show that the states have failed to
guarantee collective bargaining rights of public employees, that the
states are inherently incapable of treating their employees fairly, and that the greater nationwide uniformity stemming from a
single federal act would result in administrative simplicity and sig-

99 Cf. 1972 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 457-58 (statement of Robert T. Thompson, member, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Lab. Rel. Comm.) (diversity of approaches to
public employee regulation represents considered wisdom of each state).
100 Clark, State Sovereignty and the ProposedFederalPublic Sector Collective BargainingLegislation, in AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssoCIATIoN, supra note 92, at 112.
"I!See 1972 House Hearings,supra note 17, at 283-85 (statement of Secretary of Labor
James D. Hodgson).
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nificant cost savings. Thus far, they have not established any of
these points. The guarantee-of-rights argument amounts to little
more than an assertion that public sector bargaining is good and
that states opposing it are bad. That state-administered collective
bargaining is inherently biased has not been demonstrated either in
theory or practice. Finally, the alleged advantages of uniformity are
neither so clear nor so overwhelming as to justify the abolition of
diverse approaches.
III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM

Even if Congress found the arguments in favor of federal
legislation persuasive, it is by no means clear that it has the constitutional power to act. In Maryland v. Wirtz I0 2 the Supreme Court
held that Congress could extend the wage and hour provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards Act' 0 3 (FLSA) to ertain state and local
government employees under its power to regulate interstate
commerce. Following that decision, proponents of federal collective
bargaining legislation assumed that this same power could support
federal regulation of local government labor relations.' 0 4 Eight
years later, the Court took another look at the question and in
National League of Cities v. Usery'0 5 reversed its course. Because it
appears to condemn the type of public employee bargaining legislation currently before Congress, the case deserves analysis.
National League of Cities involved a challenge to the constitutional validity of 1974 FLSA amendments that completely
abolished the exemption previously provided to states and their
political subdivisions. Basing its decision not so much upon the
specific language of the Constitution as upon the nature of the
federal system, a majority of the Court upheld the challenge. In
the Court's words, the essential question was whether the wage and
102392 U.S. 183 (1968).

10329 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970).
04 See, e.g., Bilik, supra note 3, at 471-72; Brown, supra note 3, at 692-95; Chanin &
Snyder, The Bugaboo of Federal Preemption: An Analysis of the Relationship Between a Federal
Collective Bargaining Statute for Employees of State and Local Governments and State Statutes Affecting Such Employees, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 236, 240-41 (1975); McCann & Smiley, supra
note 3, at 539-41. Maryland v. Wirtz did not discourage opponents of federal legislation,
since four of the six justices in the majority were soon replaced by more conservative
Nixon appointees, while the two dissenters remained on the Court. Justice Marshall took
no part in the case. See Clark, supra note 100, at 112-13. See generally Beaird & Ellington, A
Commerce Power Seesaw: BalancingNationalLeague of Cities, 11 GA. L. REv. 35, 37-48 (1976).
105 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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hour determinations limited by the FLSA were "'functions essential to [the states'] separate and independent existence' . . ..so that
Congress may not abrogate the States' otherwise plenary authority
to make them."'1 6 The Court noted that applying FLSA standards
would increase the costs of some governmental services, reduce the
quantity or quality of others, and displace state policies concerning
the delivery of public services. 10 7 The conclusion followed easily
from these findings:
If Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make
those fundamental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of these functions must rest, we think
there would be little left of the States' "separate and independent
existence."

. .

. This exercise of congressional authority does not

comport with10the
federal system of government embodied in the
8
Constitution.
In even broader language, the Court stated without qualification
that "Congress may not exercise that [commerce] power so as to
force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are
to be made."1 09
These are strong words with potentially wide ramifications, for
the Court held the FLSA amendments invalid insofar as they "operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.""' 0 This
language seems at least as applicable to a public employee bargaining bill regulating all aspects of employer-employee relationships as
to a law setting minimum standards for wages and hours.
Nevertheless, National League of Cities may not settle the question. A bare majority of the Court agreed on the holding over the
bitter, unrestrained protests of three justices"' and the more moderate dissent of another."12 One new appointment could thus alter
the result, and an appointee of President Carter would probably be
more liberal than the Court's present majority. Moreover, the
five-member majority itself is not solid. The deciding vote was cast
06
Id. at 845-46 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
107 426 U.S. at 846-52.
108 1d. at 851-52.

109
Id. at 855.
11Id. at 852. The Court stated that Congress could continue to regulate nonintegral
government activities, but the only example it provided was railroads. Id. at 854 n.18.
111 Id. at 856 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, JJ.).
112
Id. at 880 (dissenting opinion, Stevens, J.).
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in a separate concurrence by Justice Blackmun. He interpreted the

Court's opinion as simply requiring a balancing approach that
would allow federal regulation in areas "where the federal interest
is demonstrably greater."' 113 Under this view, legislation imposing
bargaining procedures on the states rather than substantive terms
4
of employment might be less offensive.'
Further, the Court carefully left open other routes for attaining congressional objectives, expressing no view "as to whether different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority granted it
under other sections of the Constitution such as the spending
' 5
power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.""
This remark took on added significance shortly afterward when
the author of the National League of Cities decision, Justice Rehnquist, wrote for the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 6 that section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment granted Congress sufficient power to
apply Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 l11 to a state government. Several lower courts thereafter upheld application of the
Equal Pay Act"x 8 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act" 9
to state and local governments, at least in part on the fourteenth
amendment rationale. 120 Although collective bargaining has not
been judicially recognized as a fourteenth amendment right, it is at
"1Id. at

856 (concurring opinion, Blackmun, J.).

114 See Chanin, Can a Federal Collective Bargaining Statute for Public Employees Meet the
Requirements of National League of Cities v. Usery?: A Union Perspective, 6 J.L. & EDUC. 493,
496-99 (1977).
115426 U.S. at 852 n.17. See Fox, Federal Public Sector Labor Relations Legislation: The
Aftermath of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 U. KAN. L. REv. 105, 118-19 (1977) (discussing use of spending power as authority for Congress to enact federal collective bargaining
statute).

n1 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
117 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
118 Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
119 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.

§§

621-634 (1970 &

Supp. V 1975).

12 See, e.g., Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976) (Equal

Pay Act applies to states as employers on basis of Congress' power under § 5 of fourteenth
amendment), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718
(D. Utah 1976) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act applies to states as employers
on basis of Congress' power under commerce clause or § 5 of fourteenth amendment).
Both Acts relied on Congress' power to regulate commerce as the basis for their enactment. See Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2(b), 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (Equal Pay Act); 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)
(1970) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). Also, both Acts borrow the enforcement provisions of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)-(d) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (FLSA enforcement provisions apply to Equal Pay Act); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1970) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
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least conceivable that Congress could declare it so, thereby justifying bargaining legislation.1 22 Alternatively, Congress' broad power
to attach conditions to its existing
programs might support a care22
act.'
bargaining
drafted
fully
Finally, it might be possible to draft a bargaining bill that
skirted the National League of Cities proscription against "withdraw[ing] from the States the authority to make those fundamental
employment decisions upon which their systems for performance
of [essential] functions must rest.' 23 This would presumably permit action under the commerce power. The National Education
Ass6ciation (NEA) has taken this approach by including provisions
in its proposed bill that would allow states to prohibit public
employee strikes, make dispute resolution procedures advisory
rather than binding, and declare valid state statutes setting certain
substantive terms and conditions of public employment. 1 24 The revised NEA bill has not yet been introduced, however, and the
Court's opinion in National League of Cities is not specific enough to
assure that the NEA approach, or any approach based on the
commerce power, could survive constitutional attack.
121See Brown, Federal Regulation of Collective BargainingBy State and Local Employees:
ConstitutionalAlternatives, 29 S.C. L. REV. 343 (1977).
122See id. at 372-78; Fox, supra note 115, at 118-19. Justice Brennan, in his National
League of Cities dissent, suggested that Congress could constitutionally condition the receipt
of federal funds by the states on compliance with the FLSA. 426 U.S. at 880. Cf. Oklahoma
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947) (upholding application of Hatch Act to
state employees whose principal employment activity financed in part by federal loans or
grants). One proposed bill relies on just this theory. See H.R. 4293, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
§ 5(a) (1973) (discussed in text accompanying notes 129-33 infra). The federal government
has used this approach at least twice before. In the Depression years, the Public Works
Administration conditioned some loans to municipalities on the extension of collective bargaining rights. See Memphis Power & Light Co. v. City of Memphis, 172 Tenn. 346, 36264, 112 S.W.2d 817, 823 (1937). More recently, Congress conditioned federal aid for mass
transit programs on the preservation of collective bargaining rights held by employees of
private companies acquired by public entities. See Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964,
49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1970); City of Macon v. Marshall, 439 F. Supp. 1209 (M.D. Ga. 1977).
See generally Barnum, National Public Relations Legislation: The Case of Urban Mass Transit, 27
LAB. L.J. 168 (1976); Nolan, supra note 6, at 249-53.
123 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851.
124
See text accompanying notes 142-49 infra. See generally Chanin, supra note 114. The
NEA's theory, as expressed by Chanin, is that Justice Blackmun's interpretation of National
League of Cities is correct. Blackmun viewed the decision as adopting a balancing test that
would "not outlaw federal power . . . where the federal interest is demonstrably greater
and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (concurring opinion). According to
Chanin, all that is necessary to meet that test is legislation that "establishes a procedural
framework for decision-making, but reserves to the states the plenary authority to make
the ultimate determination in regard to wages, hours, and other substantive terms and
conditions of employment." Chanin, supra note 114, at 499.
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Utilizing one of these methods, Congress could probably develop a constitutional statutory scheme for regulating the labor
relations of state and local governments. 1 25 As Professors Wellington and Winter remind us, however, "the existence of a power
is not by itself the justification for its exercise. That depends on a
demonstration of federal responsibility and a congressional capacity to fashion workable policies."' 126 NationalLeague of Cities raises a
new and extremely important consideration in this regard-the
proper functioning of the federal system. Deference to the Court
and concern for the magnitude of the issues involved require that
Congress not regulate state and local labor relations unless it is
convinced that some action is necessary, that the states will not take
this action, and that it can fashion workable remedies not outweighed by their tangible and intangible costs.
IV
PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Advocates of public employee bargaining have introduced a
wide variety of bills in Congress during the last few years. This
diversity reflects disagreement among competing employee groups
over the goals of regulation and the best method of achieving
them. Each bill falls into one of three categories: the minimum
standards approach, the NLRA approach, and the National Public
Employment Relations Act (NPERA) approach. The first two of
these are straightforward and can be quickly described. The third
is more complex, with some extremely important policy changes
embodied in seemingly innocuous language. Accordingly it merits
more detailed treatment.
A.

The Minimum StandardsApproach
The flexibility and experimentation made possible by the federal system have convinced a number of observers that the best
federal legislation would be the least-a bill establishing certain
minimum guarantees of employee rights but leaving the states free
to protect those rights and establish additional ones as they see fit.
This approach has received strong support, not surprisingly, from
officials of existing state and local government labor relations
2'See

Brown, supra note 121, at 395.

126Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, supra

note 71, at 811.
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agencies 127 and some labor relations scholars128 but has not at-

tracted the more powerful unions or any significant number of
legislators.
Whatever political support there is for the minimum standards
approach seems almost an accidental by-product of other concerns.
Thus the Assembly of Governmental Employees (AGE), which represents state and county civil service employees, has advocated the
minimum standards approach primarily to protect the civil service
system from the consequences of collective bargaining. A bill endtled the National Public Employee Merit System and Representation Act,' 29 drafted by AGE and introduced on its behalf in the
93rd Congress, seems chiefly aimed at requiring the states to adopt
and protect the merit system. 3 ° Although the bill mandates that
the states engage in collective bargaining under penalty of loss of
all federal funds,' 3 ' it carefully
insulates the merit system from the
132
effects of such bargaining.

Congress is unlikely to pass the AGE bill for a number of
reasons. First, the bill's primary emphasis on the integrity of the
merit system would deprive politicians of the advantages of the
spoils system and unions of the advantages of the seniority system.
Second, the bill does not respond to the demands for equality and
uniformity urged by supporters of public sector bargaining. Since
some jurisdictions are likely to extend only the mandatory minimum rights to employees, the strongest supporters of congressional action will not be satisfied. Finally, the bill does not grant
public employee unions some of the important rights promised by
the other bills, such as the right to strike and the right to insist on
33
compulsory membership or financial contribution provisions.
The minimum standards approach has had some influence, how127 See, e.g., 1972 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 403 (statement of Arvid Anderson,
Chairman, Office of Collective Bargaining of New York City); AMERICAN ARBITRATION AsSOCIATION, supra note 92, at 6-37 (remarks of Robert G. Howlett, Chairman, Mich.
Employment Rel. Comm'n); id. at 168-75 (remarks of Robert D. Helsby, Chairman, New
York State Pub. Employment Rel. Bd.).
128 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3; Horton, Lewin, & Kuhn, supra note 63, at 511;

AMERICAN

ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION,

supra note 92,

at 53-61

(remarks of Arnold

R. Weber, Provost, Carnegie-Mellon Univ.).
129 H.R. 4293, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
'1See id. §§ 2(a), (c), (e), 5(a)(l).
'3,
See id. § 5(a)(4), (b).
32 See id. §§ 5(a)(1), 8.
13I The AGE bill is silent on the strike and affirmatively protects the right to refrain
from union activities. See id. §§ 4, 5(a)(2), 6(a)(3), (b)(2).
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ever, in that at least one of the proposed NPERA bills1 34 provides
exemptions for states with legislation "substantially equivalent" to
135
the NPERA.
B.

The NLRA Approach

By far the most simplistic answer to the public employee
bargaining dilemma is that offered by Representative Frank
Thompson, Jr. In its entirety, it reads: "Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That paragraph (2) of section 2 of the National Labor
Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 152(2)) is amended by striking out 'or any
State or political subdivision thereof,'.' 3 6 The Thompson bill
would subject public employees to the NLRA immediately and
without qualification. Support for the bill has for the most part
been limited to those private sector unions that are beginning to
organize public employees.137 Scholarly commentary has criticized
the bill because it contains no special provisions to deal with the
recognized differences between the public and private sectors.' 38
The Thompson bill offers powerful incentives to unions. It
would grant them, for example, the right to strike and the right to
negotiate for compulsory union membership and dues payments
clauses-rights possessed by private employees but usually denied
to public employees. Nevertheless, the NLRA approach has some
drawbacks for unions, too. Simple incorporation into the NLRA
means subjection to the Taft-Hartley' 3 9 and Landrum-Griffin' 4 0
notes 151-204 and accompanying text infra.
135H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 12 (1973).
136 H.R. 777, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Rep. Thompson's bill has previously been
identified by different numbers. See H.R. 77, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 9730. 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 12532, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
137See, e.g., 1973-1974 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 75 (statement of Richard E.
Murphy, Service Employees' International Union); id. at 205 (statement of Henry Wilson.
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Laborers' International Union). The bill has had steady support from
only one union composed primarily of public employees, the American Federation of
Teachers. See id. at 189 (statement of David Selden, President, Am. Fed'n of Teachers).
More recently, the NEA somewhat reluctantly endorsed the bill as the only one likely to
pass Congress. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 3, 42-43 (statement of Terry
Herndon, Executive Director, NEA).
'" See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 713, 716. Even academic supporters of the NLRA
approach have recognized the need for some amendments to reflect the unique aspects of
public sector relations. See McCann & Smiley, supra note 3, at 544-47.
139Labor Managment Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
140 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970 &
134See

Supp. V 1975).
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Acts as well-laws that many unions are still fighting many years
41
after passage.1
The NEA has recently prepared a somewhat more sophisticated version of the NLRA approach. 42 While following the
NLRA pattern closely, the NEA proposal makes some concessions
to the unique circumstances of public employment, and to the constitutional problems presented by the NationalLeague of Cities decision.' 43 The NEA proposal differs from Representative Thompson's in four key respects:
(1) The NEA proposal includes government supervisors in the
definition of "employee"' 44 and would in some circumstances allow
these supervisors to be included in a single bargaining unit with
45
nonsupervisors. 1
(2) It establishes a new type of impasse resolution procedure
utilizing "factfinding with recommendations" by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.' 4 6 The recommendations would be
47
advisory unless state law makes them binding.'
(3) It imposes two main limitations on public employees' right
to strike. First, the states could enact laws after passage of the NEA
bill prohibiting public sector strikes; second, a federal district court
could enjoin a public sector strike upon a finding that it presented
a "clear and present danger to the public health or safety" or that
the union failed to utilize the impasse resolution procedures pro48
vided in the act.1
(4) It allows states to set substantive terms and conditions of
49
public employment by constitution or statute.
Although the importance of these concessions should not be
underestimated, the NEA proposal still bears a much closer resemblance to the industrial model which underlies the NLRA than
it does to the public sector model upon which state legislation and
the NPERA approach are patterned. This will guarantee opposi141Thus, drafts of the union-oriented NPERA have excluded the more odious provisions of the amended NLRA while otherwise adhering closely to the original statute. See
text accompanying
notes 155-204 infra.
42
1 See NEA PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 9-14.
143 See notes 105-26 and accompanying text supra.

144See NEA PROPOSALS, supra note 2, § 2(b).
5
14
See id.§ 4. This could only happen in bargaining units of firefighters, educational
employees, and public safety officers. See id.
146Id.§ 6(b).
147

48

Id.

Id.
149
Id.§ 7(b).
1
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tion from many public employers, some public employee unions,
and virtually all state public sector labor relations officials.
It is difficult to predict the chances for success of the NLRA
approach. Perhaps its greatest hope lies in its sponsor and chief
proponent. Representative Thompson is chairman of the Special
Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education
and Labor-the subcommittee with jurisdiction over public employee bargaining matters-and ranking majority member of the
full committee. Despite Representative Thompson's efforts and
position, however, his bills have failed repeatedly in previous
150
years.
C.

The NPERA Approach
The proposed National Public Employment Relations Act
(NPERA), 151 supported by unions composed primarily of public
employees, 52 draws its inspiration from the NLRA, but differs
from that Act in a number of significant respects. It merits extended analysis for several reasons. First, the differences between
the NPERA and the NLRA reflect marked departures from existing federal labor policies. Second, the superficial resemblance between the two Acts might obscure the importance of these differences. 1 53 Finally, congressional discussion, as evidenced in the
,50 See note 136 supra.
151 Like the Thompson bill, the NPERA has been introduced in successive Congresses
since 1970. See [1970-1977) 1 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) (Reference File) 51:181. A
revision including several new provisions strengthening the position of unions was introduced in 1973 as H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). H.R. 8677 was supported by a
number of important unions composed primarily of public employees. Four of these, the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the NEA, the International Association of Fire Fighters, and the National Treasury Employees Union, formed a
group called the Coalition of American Public Employees (CAPE), which endorsed H.R.
8677. See 1973-1974 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 22 (statement of Ralph J. Flynn,
Executive Director, CAPE).
In the next Congress, however, this support seemed to disappear. A somewhat
weakened NPERA was introduced by Rep. Roybal as H.R. 1488, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), but CAPE remained silent. Meanwhile, the NEA reluctantly endorsed H.R. 77, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), the NLRA bill sponsored by Rep. Thompson. See 1975 House Hearings, supra note 17, at 42-43 (testimony of Terry Herndon, Executive Director, NEA). This
indicated that the NEA still favored separate legislation for public employees but felt it
politically expedient to unite behind the NLRA approach. Rep. Roybal reintroduced his bill
in 1977 as H.R. 1987, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
The following discussion of the NPERA is based on H.R. 8677, since that is the latest
widely supported version. Occasional reference will be made in the notes to significant
differences in Rep. Roybal's most recent offering, H.R. 1987.
2
'1 See note 151 supra.
15' Indeed, union proponents of the NPERA frequently emphasize its similarity to the
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public hearings on the NPERA, has focused almost exclusively on
expense of consideration of
the desirability of federal action, at 15the
4
take.
should
action
such
whatform
1. Expanded Definitions
The NPERA greatly expands two important NLRA terms, and
would thereby work major changes in national labor policy. The
term "employee," as defined in the NPERA, exempts only the chief
executive officer of the employer and elected or appointed
policymakers.' 55 This would have the effect of covering, and requiring collective bargaining with, several classes of workers
exempted from the NLRA, such as supervisors,1 5 6 managerial
employees, 57 and confidential employees who assist managerial
employees in the field of labor relations. 15 8 Additionally, the
NPERA broadens the scope of collective bargaining by enlarging
the NLRA's list of mandatory subjects ("wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment"' 5 9) to read "terms and conditions of employment and other matters of mutual concern relating
thereto."' 60 The difference may not seem significant at first, but in
practice the new language could require public employers to bargain with unions over many matters traditionally resolved by
elected or appointed public officials, 16 ' such as tenure provisions,
pension plans, and merit hiring and promotion systems. The Act
might even force bargaining on subjects over which private sector
employers do not have to negotiate. For example, the NPERA
might require bargaining on curriculum decisions in schools, while
on an analogous private sector issue such as an industrial
employer's choice of product lines, the NLRA does not require
162
bargaining.
NLRA. See, e.g., 1973-1974 House Hearings,supra note 17, at 22, 24, 26 (statement of Ralph J.
Flynn, Executive Director, CAPE); id. at 46, 59-71 (statement of Jerry Wurf, President,
AFSCME); 1972 House Hearings,supra note 17, at 24, 32-33, 36 (statement of Jerry Wurf,
AFSCME).
President,
15 4 See 1973-1974 House Hearings, supra note 17; 1972 House Hearings, supra note 17.
155See H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c) (1973).
56
' See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
151 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-90 (1974).
158 See id.
'59 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).

160 H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(m) (1973). H.R. 1987 follows the NLRA definition with the addition of the phrase "or any question arising thereunder" after "terms and
conditions of employment." H.R. 1987, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(c) (1977).
"I See generally Lieberman, Impact of Proposed FederalPublic Employee Bargainingon State
Legislation, 4 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SECTOR 133 (1975).
162 Compare 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 17, at 130-31 (statement of James A. Harris,
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Rights and Responsibilities

The NPERA substantially increases union rights at the expense
of rights of individual employees and employers, while drastically
reducing union responsibilities. For example, in 1947 the TaftHartley Act' 63 amended the list of protected concerted employee activities to include "the right to refrain from any or all of such activities" except as limited by a valid union security agreement. 1 6 4 This
provision is conspicuously absent from the NPERA.' 65 Additionally, under the NLRA, employers may in most circumstances prohibit access by nonemployee union officials to the employer's prop67
erty, 6 6 and may restrict other union activities to nonwork time.1
The NPERA, in contrast, would guarantee unions access "to areas
in which employees work, the right to use the employer's bulletin
boards, mailboxes, and other communications media, subject to
reasonable regulation, and the right to use the employer's facilities
at reasonable times for the purpose of meetings concerned with the
exercise of the rights guaranteed by this Act."' 161 Moreover, under
the NLRA, dues checkoff and agency shop provisions are mandatory subjects of bargaining; 1 69 that is, employers must bargain over
them upon union request, but need not agree to a union proposal
or make any concession on those issues.' 7 0 Under the NPERA, the
employer would be obliged to grant the checkoff to the exclusive
representative' 7 ' and to require all nonmember employees in the
bargaining unit to pay to the exclusive representative "an amount
equal to the dues, fees, and assessments that a member is
72
charged."'
President, NEA) (expressing view that NPERA language would give teachers right to bargain
over curriculum content), with Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223
(1954) (concurring opinion, Stewart, J.) ("Decisions concerning the volume and kind of
advertising expenditures, product design, the manner of financing, and sales" are not man-

datory subjects of bargaining).
' Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
164 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
165 H.R. 1987, however, retains the NLRA's "right to refrain." H.R. 1987, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 3 (1977).
'See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
167 See Republic Aviation Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802-03 (1945).
368 H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b)(1) (1973). H.R. 1987 does not contain this
provision.
' See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
170See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
171 See H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 5(b)(2) (1973).
172 Id. § 5(c). This provision would allow public sector unions to collect more money
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Still more important is the failure of the NPERA to include the
broad range of protections for individual employees contained in
the Landrum-Griffin Act. 1 73 In that Act, Congress sought to protect employees from oppressive, illegal, or discriminatory union
action by creating certain legally enforceable rights for union
members. Among these were the right to fair and equal treatment
and to freedom of speech and assembly, 1 7 4 the. right to require
unions to report on finances 1 75 and to hold secret ballot elections,176 and the right to bind union officers and agents to high
standards of fiduciary responsibility. 77 Neither these rights nor
any of the other remedial provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act
appear in the NPERA. The NPERA also omits several union unfair
labor practices added to the NLRA in 1947, such as forcing employers to discriminate against employees in order to encourage or
discourage union membership, 17 8 and imposing excessive or discriminatory initiation fees. 1
3.

9

Union Security

The issue of union security, fraught with the tension between
two highly prized principles-freedom of association of individual
employees and the solidarity of employees against their employers-has long been a controversial issue in labor relations. Federal labor law reflects this tension by permitting the "union shop"
and the "agency shop" but prohibiting the "closed shop."'180 Fedfrom employees than private sector unions could, for the NLRA does not permit agreements
requiring payment of "assessments." See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), (2) (1970).
113Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970 &
Supp. V 1975).
174
See id. §§ 411-415.
75 See id.§§ 431-441.
176 See id.§§ 481-483.
'17See id. §§ 501-503.
78
1 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).
179 See id.§ 158(b)(5). The following types of union conduct, prohibited by the NLRA,
are also not mentioned in NPERA: featherbedding (see id.§ 158(b)(6)); engaging in strikes,
threats, or coercion for secondary boycott or jurisdictional dispute objectives (see id.
§ 158(b)(4)); entering into "hot cargo" agreements (see id. § 158(e)); and certain picketing for
organizational or recognitional purposes (see id.§ 158(b)(7)).
I" See id.§ 158(a)(3), (b)(2). The union shop exists where the union and the employer
negotiate an agreement requiring union membership within 30 days after employment. In
an agency shop, non-union employees are required to pay money to the union in lieu of
dues and fees. The closed shop exists where the employer and the union agree that union
membership is required before employment begins. See id.29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1970) allows
"prehire" agreements only in the construction industry. See generally Haggard, A Clarification
of the Types of Union Security Agreements Affirmatively Permitted by FederalStatutes, 5 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 418 (1974).
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eral law also allows individual states to outlaw any or all of these
agreements.' 81 Union security agreements are further limited by
section 9(e) of the NLRA, which allows employees to rescind the
union's authority to negotiate union security agreements, 182 and by
the fact that the only condition of "membership" that can be required by lawful agreements is the tendering of "the periodic dues
and the initiation fees uniformly required."' 1813 Thus, the required
membership is "whittled down to its financial core,"' 8 4 or to the
equivalent of the agency shop.
Public sector union security agreements raise more significant
problems than those in the private sector. Although the agency
shop is constitutional in the public sector, 8 5 it raises troublesome
first amendment issues.' 86 Moreover, the ultimate penalty under
such agreements-dismissal of otherwise competent employees for
failure to support a union-blatantly contravenes the merit principle followed in most state public employment systems. 187 These
factors, together with the public's general antipathy toward union
security agreements, 188 explain why relatively few
states allow the
89
union shop or agency shop in the public sector.
Given this background, the NPERA provisions dealing with
81 See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970).
182 See id. § 159(e).
83

' Id. § 158(a)(3)(ii)(B).
184 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
186 See id. at 244-64 (concurring opinion, Powell, J.).
187
See Helburn & Bennett, supra note 64, at 622-23. Although union security agree185

ments are usually enforced by dismissal or the threat thereof, these are not the only means
available. State law permitting, public sector unions could negotiate provisions for dues
deductions by the employer without authorization by the affected employees. Alternatively,
the contract could simply give the union a cause of action against bargaining unit employees
for dues or agency shop fees. Such provisions are extremely rare, however, since most
unions prefer to rely upon the threat of dismissal.
188 According to a recent Gallup poll, 63% oppose the union shop and only 31% favor it.
This differential has increased markedly since 1966, when 49% were opposed and 42% in
favor. See 95 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 78-79 (1977). Another poll reached similar results, 58%
believing that the law should be changed to prohibit compulsory membership or dues payment requirements, and only 30% opposing such a change. OPINION RESEARCH CoRn'., PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RIGHT To WORK LAWS 7 (1976). Public opposition to compulsory

unionism in the public sector is even more pronounced. In February of 1977, for example,
69% of the persons questioned in one poll opposed compulsory union support rules for
public employees, while only 17% favored such requirements. THE ROPER ORGANIZATION,
INC., PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD RIGHT TO WORK

....

Question 24 (1977).

189 As of 1976, only 15 states permitted union security agreements to apply to any of

their public employees (and several of these permitted them only for certain types of public
employees), while 32 states prohibited such agreements for at least some classes of public
employees. See [1976] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 655, at D-1 to D-2.
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union security are surprising. The NPERA proposes a radical
change that would limit the rights of individual public employees
far more than the NLRA does in the private sector. Under the
NPERA, states could not prohibit compulsory unionism and
employees could not rescind the union's authority in this regard.
The NPERA would require the agency shop in all contracts
negotiated by the exclusive representative' 90 and would attempt to
legalize the true union shop by authorizing agreements requiring
employees to "become and remain a member of the recognized
organization."'19
Establishment of Representative Status
Under the NLRA, the secret ballot election is the key element
in the determination of a union's right to represent a group of
employees. A union claiming to represent a majority of the
employees in an appropriate unit may request recognition from an
employer, but the employer may refuse the request and force the
92
union to prove its majority status in a secret ballot election.'
Moreover, even if the employer chooses to grant the union's request for recognition, dissenting employees may obtain a secret
ballot election to test the union's representative status. 1 93 Finally, a
union can be certified by the National Labor Relations Board only
after winning a secret ballot election.' 94
The NPERA provides several ways for public sector unions to
obtain recognition and certification without providing employees
an opportunity to vote. An employer faced with a union demand
for recognition supported by "credible evidence" must recognize
the union absent current recognition of another union, an election
within the past year, or a "good faith doubt" about the union's
majority status in an appropriate unit.195 Once recognized, the
union may request and must receive certification by the Commission set up to administer the NPERA without an election un4.

1

"'See H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 5(c), 10(a)(3) (1973).
191 Id. §§ 5(d), 10(a)(3). Subsections 5(c) and (d) clearly imply that more may be required

of public employees than mere "financial core membership," but the issue is clouded by
§ 10(a)(3)(ii), which prohibits employer discrimination against employees for nonmembership if membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than failure to tender dues,
fees, and assessments to the union.
192 Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
193 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970).
194Id. § 159(c).
1/
195H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 6(b) (1973). H.R. 1987 follows the NLRA pattern
and protects the right to an election. H.R. 1987, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1977).
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less another employee organization objects.1 96 Non-union employees
are given no absolute right to an election to determine the union's
status prior to recognition, although there may be an election after
the fact if the Commission deems it necessary. 9 7 The Commission
may certify the union without an election even where the employer
has denied the employees' request for an election or where dissenting employees have filed a petition with the Commission. 98 Decisions of the Commission in favor of the union's position-unlike
those opposed--"shall not be subject to judicial review or other
collateral attack."'19 9
5.

Dispute Resolution

In the private sector, disputes over the terms or interpretation
of a contract are resolved by resort to economic weapons, such as
strikes, unless the parties agree to turn unresolved issues over to an
arbitrator for decision. Because public sector strikes are generally
prohibited, a number of state public sector bargaining laws mandate arbitration of disputes over contract terms ("interest arbitration") or over the interpretation or application of existing terms
("grievance arbitration"). 20 0 Employers and unions in both sectors,
however, have been suspicious of, if not completely opposed to,
mandatory arbitration. This opposition rests upon the belief that
the collective bargaining system can function effectively only when
the parties themselves bear complete responsibility for the results
of collective bargaining. Public employers object to compulsory arbitration on the additional ground that it removes matters of public
policy from the hands of duly elected or appointed representatives
of the people and allows arbitrators not responsible to the public to
make decisions binding upon the public.20 '
The NPERA provisions dealing with arbitration favor public
sector unions. Most significantly, they contravene the nearly uniform policy of federal and state governments against public
196 H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(d), (e)(iii) (1973).
197See id. § 6(d).
"' Id. § 6(d), (e)(ii).

199 Id. § 6(g).
200 On the use of arbitration in the public sector, see Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in
Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REv. 459 (1971); Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives: The
Public Employment Experience, 63 Ky. L.J. 430 (1975); Note, The Strike and Its Alternatives in
Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 549.
201 On the objections to compulsory arbitration, see Loewenberg, The Effect of Compulsoy
Arbitration on Collective Negotiations, 1 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PUB. SEaCrOR 177, 177-79

(1972).
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employee strikes and legalize such strikes over contract term disputes.2 °2 The NPERA also mandates arbitration of disputes over
the interpretation or application of agreements, 0 3 and gives the
union an unusual option regarding disputes over the terms themselves. If the mediation efforts are unsuccessful, either party may
have the dispute submitted to fact finding with recommendations;
such recommendations are merely advisory, however, unless the
union-and only the union-decides beforehand that it wants them
to be binding. 20 4 The public employer does not have this option.
6. Summary
The foregoing discussion indicates that the NPERA is a grossly
one-sided bill. Federal legislation should not grant public employee
unions much more power than their private sector counterparts,
while simultaneously imposing upon them far fewer responsibilities. As presently written, the NPERA would create a serious
imbalance in public sector labor relations that would work to the
detriment of society. Congress should pass it, if at all, only after
root-and-branch amendment to make the bill more representative
of current views on labor policy as embodied in the NLRA, the
Landrum-Griffin Act, and existing state and federal public sector
legislation.
CONCLUSION

The debate over federal legislation on public sector collective
bargaining continues unabated. The issues raised are not frivolous,
nor are they smokescreens set up by devious employers to maintain
the subjugation of their employees. To the contrary, many of the
issues cast doubt upon the essential equity of the proposals in Congress and others raise fundamental questions about the operation
of government in a free society.
Given the magnitude of these problems, the public has every
right to demand convincing evidence that public sector collective
bargaining contributes to the common good, that the existing state
laws and court decisions on the subject are inadequate, that federal
202

See H.R. 8677, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) (1973). A court may enjoin a strike if it is in

violation of the binding recommendations of a fact-finder (see id. § 7(c)(i)); in violation of a
valid collective bargaining agreement (see id. § 9(c)); if the court finds that the strike "poses a
clear and present danger to the public health or safety" (see id. § 9(b)(i)); or if the union fails
to utilize the specified impasse resolution procedure (see id. § 9(b)(ii)).
203 See id. § 8(a), (b).
20 4
Id. § 7(b).
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legislation is essential, and that the proposed legislation would
strike a fair balance among competing concerns in labor relations
policy. To date, proponents of federal action have been woefully
remiss in supplying such evidence.
Notwithstanding widespread experience with public sector collective bargaining, there has been no indication that it benefits the
public at large. It does not eliminate any demonstrated inequity
between the working conditions of public and private employees.
It does not reduce the incidence of strikes, and may, in fact, do
the opposite. It is not essential to protect public employees from
callous and indifferent employers. Most important, public sector
bargaining may create more problems than it will remedy by increasing the cost and reducing the quality of public services, by
interfering with the merit system, and by threatening the delicate
balance of the political order in our pluralistic society.
Even assuming that the benefits of public sector bargaining
offset its drawbacks, its proponents have not shown the need for
federal legislation. There is no evidence that state and local governments currently violate rights of their employees or that they
are incapable of impartially administering their own labor relations
statutes. Bargaining advocates have also failed to demonstrate any
clear advantage to uniformity among the states on labor relations
questions. On the contrary, there is good reason to believe that an
imposed uniformity would stifle the creativity and flexibility offered by a decentralized system.
The Constitution also provides a potential roadblock to the
enactment of federal public sector bargaining legislation. Although
it might be possible to draft a bill without violating the Constitution, the spirit of that document as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery would suffer a major blow
if the federal government were to proclaim the method of handling labor relations in every fire department, school district, and
city hall in the land.
Finally, each of the three proposals for federal legislation is at
best inadequate, at worst pernicious. The least offensive of the
three, the minimum standards approach, would force all local governments into the adversarial relationship of collective bargaining,
exclusive representation, and mandatory grievance arbitration, and
would create a federal agency controlling local government actions
by litigation over representation issues, bargaining obligations, and
unfair labor practices. The other approaches, far more likely to be
adopted, would restrict local governments to an even greater ex-
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tent. The NLRA approach would impose the industrial collective
bargaining model on a vastly different enterprise. At its extreme, it
would authorize strikes by police and firemen with no attempt to
protect the public from resulting problems. The NPERA approach,
while making some concessions to the unique aspects of governmental employment, would more than offset those concessions
by distorting the balance reached in the NLRA on such issues as
union security, union responsibilities, and scope of bargaining. The
balance struck would favor public employee unions not at the expense of the employer, but at the expense of the individual
employee and the taxpaying public.
An analysis of the current arguments for federal legislation
reinforces the conclusion reached several years ago by Professors
Wellington and Winter: the subject, at best, should be "a matter of
very low priority on the federal agenda. ' 20 5 An examination of the
proposals presently under consideration leads to an even harsher
conclusion: until proponents of federal legislation can draft a bill
with consequences less inimical to the common good, the problem
ought to be left to local regulation. State and local programs may
not provide a panacea for public sector labor problems, but they
more accurately reflect local concerns. More importantly, errors of
state and local governments are of limited impact and capable of
correction without a continuing national debate.
205

Wellington & Winter, Structuring Collective Bargainingin Public Employment, supra note

71, at 811.

